2021 MFF 穆斯林影展－Tafakkur 沈思｜理解伊斯蘭之途徑：教義、文化、意識形態與烏托邦 Approaches to the Understanding of Islam: Doctrine, Culture, ldeology and Utopia｜想像伊斯蘭：電影中身份與意識形態的戰爭 Imagining Islam: The Battle of Identity and Ideology in Film
2021 MFF 穆斯林影展－Tafakkur 沈思｜預防性族群壓迫、同化、種族滅絕：中國對新疆維吾爾與其他穆斯林少數族裔的嚴酷統治 Preventive oppression, assimilation or genocide: China’s draconian rule of Uyghur and other minorities Muslims in Xinjiang｜弔詭的「中國化」聖戰︰當前中國伊斯蘭仇恐情結下的穆斯林同化策略 The paradoxical Jihad of “Sinicization”: New coming campaign of Muslim assimilation under the spreading Islamophobic sentiment in contemporary China
穆斯林影展「沈思」：首日側記
日期：2021年10月22日
地點：ZOOM 線上座談
記錄者：Irfan Muhammad
中文翻譯：黃凱薈
國立陽明交通大學文化研究國際中心（ICCS-NYCU）2021年穆斯林影展「沈思」（Tafakkur）首場講座活動，即是新加坡國立大學（National University of Singapore）社會學與馬來研究系教授Syed Farid Alatas所主講的「理解伊斯蘭之途徑:教義、文化、意識形態與烏托邦」（Approaches to the Understanding of Islam: Doctrine, Culture, Ideology, and Utopia）
Syed Farid Alatas強調，就像看待其他宗教一樣，我們應當將伊斯蘭的廣泛教義，與反映人類觀點、感受、文化偏見的人為詮釋相互比較。
伊斯蘭是個宏大的宗教，包含了許多原始、純粹、普世的價值。然而，如今卻有許多對穆斯林的負面描繪，認為穆斯林厭女、暴力甚至涉及恐怖行動。這意味著人們雖然能對有利人類的普世觀點有所共鳴，但同時也依據自身的感受、文化偏見，乃至是人性與生俱來的惡念，詮釋這些教義。
我們必須理解我們所謂的「伊斯蘭」，並如同理解其他宗教一般，從不同的層次去理解伊斯蘭。對穆斯林來說，伊斯蘭就是真主的旨意，但當不同的人接觸、閱讀及詮釋宗教時，就會產生出對教義的不同解讀。
我們接著討論到穆斯林的文化，即他們的物質及思想文化，是否受到伊斯蘭的影響。無論如何，這些文化都將反映到伊斯蘭身上。「穆斯林文化」與「伊斯蘭」之前的關係有三種理解的方式。
第一種理解，穆斯林文化直接受到伊斯蘭影響。Farid舉例，穆斯林按日曆齋戒的文化就是直接受伊斯蘭影響，是全球各地穆斯林共同實踐的傳統文化。另一個類似的例子則是「多福」（abundant）概念，其中的部份宗教實踐，影響了一些穆斯林的人生。此外，穆斯林社群習以為常的小事物，例如使用右手的三根手指抓飯的習慣，被視為穆斯林進食應有的儀態。
第二種理解，則是穆斯林的生活方式，與伊斯蘭教義背道而馳。伊斯蘭從未禁止女性接受教育。伊斯蘭肯認女性的財產權，旁人包括其丈夫無權剝奪其財產權。即使如此，在一些伊斯蘭社會中，女性不僅禁止接受教育，其財產權更是遭到剝奪。
第三種理解，伊斯蘭對個人生活沒有任何影響。以清真食品而言，伊斯蘭規定穆斯林使用清真食品，卻未明確表明為何種食物。吃麵包抑或吃米飯，端看個別社群的既有飲食文化。
Farid說，上述這些都能與伊斯蘭掛鉤，但當我們試圖檢視穆斯林時，我們必須很清楚自己試圖談論的是什麼。我們是在談論《古蘭經》、伊斯蘭的宗教實踐、經由人們所詮釋而產生差異的宗教教義，或是不同的哲學流派？是蘇菲派（Sufism）嗎？還是普遍的穆斯林？
對於一些穆斯林而言，特別是穆斯林菁英，伊斯蘭不僅是個宗教或神啟。反之伊斯蘭鞏固了他們的社會地位。因此，這類觀點可歸類為意識形態，或烏托邦。
打個比方，有的人相信「伊斯蘭經濟」，聲稱伊斯蘭經濟是按照伊斯蘭教義的良好經濟體系。然而，他們所謂的伊斯蘭經濟，實際上服膺資本家的利益。Farid解釋，「倡議者聲稱它是純然伊斯蘭的，但我們認為這是親資本家的立場」。
另一邊廂，我們其實可以發現，穆斯林的政治經濟立場更傾向於社會主義，對抗著資本主義。大約在100年前，印尼的Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminto就曾寫過，伊斯蘭與社會主義是如何對抗荷蘭殖民者的資本主義壓迫。「所以，他們懷抱某種烏托邦的想法，無意於保護或維繫體制，而是要推翻它。」
簡單來說，伊斯蘭必須以不同層次的方式來理解。首先，我們必須釐清所謂的「伊斯蘭」實際上指的是什麼。我們說的是普世伊斯蘭，是教義、是理論、是意識形態、是烏托邦，還是人們的文化？其次，我們必須理解伊斯蘭是異質的。穆斯林群體之間的宗教實踐、文化都有著巨大的差異，因為這些並非只受到伊斯蘭的影響，也受到社會、地理、歷史等諸多因素的影響。
另一名講者印尼作家兼學者Okky Puspa Madasari則以「想像伊斯蘭：電影中身份與意識形態的戰爭」（Imagining Islam: The Battle of Identity and Ideology in Film）為題，放映多部影片講解印尼伊斯蘭電影版圖的概況。
Okky表示，電影中再現的伊斯蘭，隨著時間的轉移而有所改變。電影創作者如何想像伊斯蘭，與他們處境、環境，以及社會事件息息相關。電影是意識形態的戰場，透過電影創作者及其觀眾的背景，我們能夠探尋他們所再現的是哪一種伊斯蘭。
他比較了1998年的《Tjut Nja’ Dhien》和2000年代中期的《愛的詩篇》（Ayat-Ayat Cinta）。前者描述個性堅毅的穆斯林女性對抗殖民主義，而後者則講述女性忙著吸引男性的注意，因相信一夫多妻在其信仰的宗教是崇高的行為，而允許其丈夫迎娶多名妻子。
我們需要將這兩部影片放在「1998年以前」和「1998年以後」，印尼的時代脈絡來理解。1998年以前，印尼曾有過壓制伊斯蘭的時光，伊斯蘭的生活方式和流行文化皆遭到邊緣。然而在1998年以後，穆斯林在政治上及日常生活中都獲得自由，伊斯蘭的生活方式和流行文化成為了主流。電影中，配戴頭巾的女性被刻畫為良善的，反之則是壞女人。
電影是身份認同與意識形態的戰場，它不僅僅再現穆斯林群體，或是面向穆斯林觀眾，它亦是宣揚特定伊斯蘭教義和生活方式的宣傳工具，甚至是政治力量。
Okky認為，這個戰場存在於電影之內，也在電影之外。「電影之內」的戰場，包含了圍繞在劇情、主角、造型乃至演員和製作人的宗教信仰等的辯論；「電影之外」的戰場則涉及公眾對電影的接受度，以及各方的審查，包括來自穆斯林演員、政府當局、不認同電影中伊斯蘭觀點的穆斯林領袖。鑑於穆斯林領袖的影響力，電影敘事並非如同我們想像的自由。
一般而言，電影製作人的反應可分為三種：有的會自我審查，有的試圖協調，有的則為了捍衛言論自由而抵抗。然而，抵抗者的下場，往往是電影遭到意識形態不同者禁播，更甚者攻擊或監禁他們。
電影放映
穆斯林影展首日放映了兩部印尼電影。
第一部是2019年由Ari Trismana執導的《以信仰之名》（Atas Nama Percaya），本片是由在日惹大學宗教與跨文化研究中心（CRCS UGM）、WatchdoC 、波士頓大學琶帝全球研究院（Pardee School of Global Studies），在亨利盧斯基金會（Henry Luce Foundation）的資助下，合作完成的紀錄片，片長共36分鐘。
電影紀錄了西爪哇省（West Java）及東努沙登加拉省（East Nusa Tenggara）的傳統民俗信仰者的生活。他們長期遭受歧視，有者被迫自稱信仰六大官方宗教，有者則被指控為無神論者及共產主義者。
直至2017年，印尼憲法法院才允許將原住民的傳統信仰註記到身份證上，為不同宗教信仰的平權道路立下重要里程碑。然而，此後仍有許多挑戰，西爪哇省的「心路之流」（Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan）社群及東努沙登加拉的「馬拉普」（Marapu）社群就在這部紀錄片中講述這段的故事。
第二部則是印尼著名導演Hanung Bramantyo執導的《?》，講述印尼的宗教多元主義。
印尼的宗教多元經常造成相互誤解，甚至引發衝突。這部紀錄片以佛教、伊斯蘭及天主教三個不同宗教信仰家庭的互動，來呈現印尼的這一面貌。這部紀錄片完成呈現了印尼的宗教生活，包括基督徒因著部份穆斯林種族歧視華裔而誤解伊斯蘭。事實上，有不少中庸的穆斯林，勇於捍衛不同宗教信仰者，並反對極端伊斯蘭思想。
*****
影展首日的第二環節著重於維吾爾族的危機。維吾爾族是居住在中國新疆地區的少數民族，其中大部分為穆斯林，經常遭受壓迫。
2007年發表的紀錄片《走繩索的孤兒》（On the Tightrope）講述了新疆孤兒院中維吾爾族兒童的故事。媒體雖已廣泛報道中國政府對維吾爾族的壓迫，而本片試圖以不同的角度描繪他們的生活。片中並未強調這些壓迫是如何實施，而是訪談那些夢想傳承高空走繩這項維吾爾族傳統活動，成為走繩表演者的兒童。
導演Petr Lom藉由「走繩索」，隱喻維吾爾族如何在穆斯林生活，以及共產主義政權的限制之間，維持平衡。他們的宗教實踐在受到限制的同時，持續被灌輸成為「中國人」，最終成為共產主義者的思想。
銜接在電影放映後的，是國防安全研究院副研究員侍建宇，以及國立政治大學民族學系教授張中復得映後討論會。
侍建宇引述美國普度大學社會學家楊鳳崗的「宗教三色市場論」解釋，中國政府為了有效管制，將宗教分為三大類。第一類被稱為紅色市場，即官方承認五大宗教：道教、佛教、伊斯蘭、天主教和基督新教；第二類灰色市場（gray market），即是未獲承認、法律上未定義的宗教，包括民間信仰等等；第三類黑色市場（black market），則是被認定為非法宗教，或中國政府所稱的邪教。
中國國家主席習近平試圖將所有宗教「轉紅」，消除灰色和黑色市場。 2017年修訂的《宗教事務條例》加強了上述「轉紅」。 這項政策始於2016年，中國政府當時通過「全國宗教工作會議」制定了四項限制，其中包括宗教必須貫徹社會主義觀，宣揚社會主義及中共之意識形態。法規中「宗教極端主義」的定義模糊，讓其他宗教傳教者、信徒或資助者都深怕被視作「邪教」，而遭受嚴厲懲罰。外界普遍相信，這些條例旨在針對伊斯蘭。
新疆當前局勢混亂，不僅中國試圖「安全化」伊斯蘭信仰，更有極端組織聲稱，新疆的某個政治整營，即東突厥斯坦伊斯蘭運動，受到發動911事件的蓋達組織（al Qaeda）影響。
對此，中國政府採取預防性措施，先行攻擊潛在的侵略和危險。中國政府先是正當化「反恐」或「去極端化」的需求，隨後透過預防性壓迫，按照漢族佔多數的情況，重塑新疆社會，以維持現狀。
對新疆穆斯林的宗教迫害層出不窮。所謂「非法」宗教建築不斷遭到拆除，包括建築本體、宗教號誌、阿拉伯文字，甚至是墓園及神龕；嚴禁日常生活中的伊斯蘭宗教實踐，女性不可戴頭巾，男性不得蓄鬍。中國政府也驅散穆斯林的集體禮拜、逮捕宗教領袖。清真寺的裝潢陳設也受到管制，寺裡掛上習近平或毛澤東的肖像和標語，寺外門前則升起中國國旗以展現愛國。
侍建宇稱，中國政府持續強調，伊斯蘭或恐怖主義的全球化，如今已危及新疆維吾爾族和其他突厥少數民族的伊斯蘭教實踐。根據他的聯絡人，維吾爾族穆斯林可分為三類：伊斯蘭文化實踐者、非政治的伊斯蘭教選擇性實踐者、伊斯蘭政治實踐者。其中，第三類人可再細分成更多群體，如政治人物、伊斯蘭聖戰分子。不過，大多數維吾爾族穆斯林屬於第一類。
另一名講者張中復也有類似的看法。張中復在題為「弔詭的『中國化』聖戰：當前中國恐懼伊斯蘭情結下的穆斯林同化運動”的演講中解釋，伊斯蘭其實存在於中國已久，且長期獲得中國人的接納。
不過，中國的穆斯林又分為兩種，即口說華語的回族穆斯林，以及口說突厥語的維吾爾族穆斯林。說華語的穆斯林占穆斯林群體的主導地位，而中國近代超過千年的歷史中，穆斯林少數與漢族多數已在文化變遷、社會適應和民族認同三個維度中，形成了共生的結構。
因此，中國雲南、臨夏等省份有相當多的伊斯蘭教徒，其實也不是什麼新鮮事。這些地區口說華語的穆斯林，有別於新疆穆斯林的情況，其宗教實踐相對獲得國家的支持。比如在雲南，儒家思想和伊斯蘭思想良好地交融。格迪目派（Qadim） 和蘇菲派（Tarekat）等古老的宗教派別，亦體現出中國西北地區的中國元素。從清真寺建築就能清楚看見這點，其建築風格帶有中國色彩，而非阿拉伯風格。此外，作為伊斯蘭蘇菲主義教派之一，臨夏的哲赫林耶派（Jahriyya）信徒是透過燒香向宗教導師穆爾西德（murshid）表達尊重及紀念。
問題是，為何近年來，中國會開始出現恐懼伊斯蘭的現象呢？
中國反伊斯蘭情緒不同於西方的恐懼伊斯蘭。在西方國家，對伊斯蘭教的恐懼與他們對移民的觀感息息相關。而在中國，伊斯蘭教並不是新興宗教，而是早已存在了數千年的信仰。中共在2012年以「宗教中國化」這個模棱兩可的理由，發動新一輪对同化穆斯林的戰爭，使仇視伊斯蘭的情緒蔓延開來。政府透過新媒體，特別是網路廣為政宣，以漢族為主的極左知識分子也開始公開發表針對穆斯林的仇恨言論。
中共「宗教中國化」目的顯然指向聖戰思維、口說華語的瓦哈比派（Wahhabism）穆斯林，以及新疆突厥語系穆斯林。然而，我們該如何區辨哪些是中共的目標群體，而哪些又是傳統且已在地化的穆斯林？
2015年，中國政府明文禁止傳播三種他們認為會將中國伊斯蘭推向極端的伊斯蘭傾向，即「阿化」（Arabicization）、「沙化」（Saudicization，指瓦哈比派）及「清真泛化」（Pan-Islamization，指涉特定政治派系例如Ikhwan）。政府也因此下令改造清真寺內的阿拉伯符號，例如圓頂清真寺在中國不復存在，取而代之的是漢族常用的儒家風格寺廟建築。
張中復表示，新疆危機和中國激增的極端反穆斯林信仰，將造成民族分裂主義、國際恐怖主義及宗教極端主義的三大威脅。惟他認為，中國大部分穆斯林實際上是溫和派。中國的漢族多數和穆斯林少數之間，已建立了長達數百年的共生關係，只有在接納溫和派伊斯蘭作為「中華文明」的一部分，允許穆斯林在中國保有其社會文化身份認同，才得以維繫下去。
Activity Report: The Tafakkur ICCS-NYCU Muslim Film Festival Day 1
Date: 2021/10/22
Venue: Zoom webinar
Text: Irfan Muhammad (M.A. Student at IACS-UST at NYCU)
The first lecture of the Tafakkur ICCS-NYCU Muslim Film Festival 2021 was opened by professor Syed Farid Alatas from the Department of Sociology and Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. On the topic of “Approaches to the Understanding of Islam: Doctrine, Culture, Ideology, and Utopia”, Prof. Farid said, like any other religion, we must view Islam from its universal teachings and compare it with human-made interpretations that reflect the witnesses, feelings, and cultural biases of human-being.
Islam is a big religion that has many pure, pristine, universal values. However, there are many negative portrayals of Muslims on misogyny, violence, or terrorist acts. This goes to show that while humans are able to resonate with universal ideas that are good for humanity; at the same time, they will also interpret these teachings based on their feelings, cultural biases, and even the innate human capacity to be evil.
We must understand what we mean by Islam and understand Islam from many different levels like any other religion. For Muslims, Islam should be how it is intended by God, but once that religion is revealed to, read, and interpreted by human beings, different opinions about the doctrine will arise.
We then come to the discussion on the culture of Muslims where their material and idea culture may or may not be influenced by Islam. Nevertheless, this culture will always reflect upon Islam. There are three ways to understand the relationship between Muslim culture and Islam, and the first is where culture is directly influenced by Islam. One example brought up by Prof. Farid is the culture of breaking fast with dates. Practised by the Prophet Muhammad PBUH, breaking fast with dates has become a traditional culture directly influenced by Islam that is practised by Muslims everywhere. Similar examples are abundant, and while some of these practices influence a Muslim’s entire life, there are also small things that are taken for granted by the Muslim community, such as the habit of eating with their right hand and eating with three fingers which are considered good manners for a Muslim.
Secondly, there is the way of life of a Muslim that can be against or contrary to the teachings of Islam. Islam never prohibited women from receiving an education. Islam also gave women property rights that cannot be claimed by anyone including her husband. Yet in some Islamic societies, women are not only prohibited from learning but also being stripped of their rights over their property. For the third way, Islam is neutral and has nothing to say over one’s way of life. Taking halal food as an example, Islam regulates halal food for Muslims, but not specifically on certain foods. It goes back to the tradition of the community whether to eat bread or rice.
According to Prof. Farid, all these can be associated with Islam, but when it comes to the assessments of Muslims, we have to be clear about what we want to talk about. Are we talking about the Quran, the practices in Islam, the religious doctrines that are diverse and based on interpretation of human beings, or are we talking about schools of philosophy, the Sufism order, or Muslims in general?
In the views of some Muslims, especially Muslim elites, Islam is more than just a religion or revelation. Instead, it reinforces their position in society or social situations. For that reason, these views can be classified as ideology and utopia.
Take the example of people who believe in Islamic economics. They claim that Islamic economics is based on Islamic teachings and a good economic system. However, what they call Islamic economics reflects capitalist interests where”the proponent claims it is purely Islam, but we can say this is the pro-capitalist stance,” said Prof. Farid.
On the other hand, we can also find Muslims fighting against capitalism through a political-economic stance that is more socialist. In Indonesia, for example, about 100 years ago, there is Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminto who wrote about Islam and socialism against capitalist oppression by the Dutch colonial.
“So they had utopian ideas in the sense that the ideas were not meant to conserve or to preserve the system, but rather to overthrow the system,” said Prof. Farid.
The basic takeaway is that Islam needs to be understood from many levels. We must first clarify what does Islam mean. Are we referring to the universal Islam, its doctrine, theories, ideologies, utopians, or people culture? Secondly, Islam is heterogeneous. There are very vast differences among Muslims in terms of the practices, culture, and designs influenced not only by the revelation of Islam but by many other social, geographical and historical factors.
Also speaking at MMF-NYCU 2021 is Okky Puspa Madasari, an Indonesian novelist, essayist, and academic. On the topic of “Imagining Islam: The Battle of Identity and Ideology in Film”, Okky screened some movies at the forum to introduce the Indonesian landscape of Islamic films.
According to Okky, Islam has been portrayed in different imaginations along with history. How filmmakers have been imagining Islam cannot be separated from the conditions, situations and events within their society. The films are a battleground of ideologies, and through the background of its filmmakers and its audiences, we can see what kind of Islam is presented in it.
Okky then made a comparison between the film “Tjut Nja’ Dhien” released in 1998 and “Ayat-ayat Cinta ” which was released in the mid-2000s. While “Tjut Nya’ Dhien” from 1998 features Muslim women with strong character who are against colonialism, “Ayat-ayat Cinta” that was made after 1998 was about a woman busy getting attention from a man, who at the end of the day allow her husband to do polygamy because she believes it is a noble thing to do in her religion.
To understand that, we also have to make clear the status and condition of Indonesia before 1998 and after 1998. Before 1998, there was repression against Islam. As a result, the Islamic lifestyle and Islamic pop culture were marginalized. On the contrary, after 1998, Muslims gained their freedom in politics and daily life, and so Islamic lifestyle and pop culture gained dominance. The girl in the hijab, for example, is characterized as good and moral in the film, while those who are not wearing it are bad.
When the film is a battlefield of identity and ideology, not only does the film function to represent a Muslim group or reach Muslim audiences, it also functions as an indoctrination tool to promote certain Islamic teachings and ways of life, or on the other hand as political power.
The battle, Okky said, happens inside and outside the film. On the inside, debates surround the story, leading roles, the costumes, and even the religious faiths of the casts and filmmakers. After the film is released, the battle continues with public reception and censorship, sometimes coming from Muslim actors, authorities, or leaders who don’t agree with the Islamic perception of the film. As the comments from Muslim leaders carries influence, the narrative of the film is not as free as we thought.
There are three kinds of responses or stances taken by the filmmakers. Some of them will do self-censoring, some of them will choose to negotiate, and some of them, for the sake of freedom of expression, will choose to resist these doctrines. However, for those who choose to resist, it is not infrequent to face a screening ban from those who do not agree with their ideologies, and some of them are even being attacked or jailed.
Film Screening
Two films from Indonesia were screened on the first day of the Muslim Film Festival. The first film, “Atas Nama Percaya” (In the Name of Belief), directed in 2019 by Ari Trismana, is a collaborative work between the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) UGM, WatchdoC Documentary, and the Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, with support from the Henry Luce Foundation.
This 36-minute film documents the lives of penghayat (believers) of ancestral beliefs or folk religions in West Java and East Nusa Tenggara. They have experienced a long history of discrimination, ranging from being forced to identify themselves with one of six state-recognized religions, to being accused of being atheists and communists.
It was only after 2017 when the Constitutional Court allowed them to list their indigenous religions on their identity cards had there was significant progress in recognizing equal rights for this community of believers. However, some challenges remain. The Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan community in West Java and the Marapu community in East Nusa Tenggara tells the story in this film.
The second film screened was entitled “?”. Directed in 2011 by a famous Indonesian director, Hanung Bramantyo, this film portrays Indonesia’s religious pluralism.
Religious diversity in Indonesia often results in misconceptions among each other, which leads to conflict. This situation is represented in this film through the interactions of three families with different religions: Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism.
The religious life in Indonesia is fully portrayed in this film as well from the Christians’ wrong assumption of Islam to some Muslims who are racist toward ethnic Chinese. Yet, on the contrary, there are also moderate Muslims who dare to defend people of other religions and are against extreme Islamic ideas.
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The second session of the first day features the Uyghur crisis that in recent years has come under the spotlight. Uyghurs, a Muslim-majority ethnic group inhabiting the Xinjiang region under the control of the PRC (People’s Republic of China) authorities, are part of a vulnerable group that often faces repression.
Under this theme, the festival screened a film entitled “On the Tightrope”. Released in 2007, this documentary by Petr Lom follows the stories of Uyghur children living in an orphanage in China’s Xinjiang province. Although the repression of the Uyghur ethnic group by the PRC government has been widely reported, Lom tries to describe their lives differently. Instead of describing how the repression was carried out, he conducted interviews with children who dream of becoming tightrope walkers, which is an Uyghur ancestral tradition.
Through tightrope walking, Lom seems to want to show how Uyghurs balance their lives as Muslims living under the communist regime. On one hand, they are restricted in their religious practices; on the other hand, they continue to be indoctrinated to become Chinese and eventually become communists.
Following the screening is a panel discussion between Prof. Chien-Yu Shih, the associate Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research and Prof. Chang Chung Fu from the Department of Ethnology, National Chengchi University. One of the rationales behind the PRC’s repression of ethnic Xinjiang, said Prof. Shih, was the attempt of Sinicization through state control over religion. To have control over religion, PRC requires the religion to improvise along with Chinese culture and ethics. Prof. Shih then quoted Prof. Fenggang Yang, a sociologist from Purdue University, on his theory of the triple “religious market”.
For control purposes, the religion is divided into three groups by PRC authorities. The first group is referred to as the red market. There are five religions officially recognized by the PRC government: Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. The second group is the grey market, namely religions that are unrecognized and legally undefined religions, including folk religion and others. The third one is the black market. This group is identified as an illegal religion, or in PRC government terms, referred to as an evil cult.
Xi Jinping, the president of PRC, attempts to make all religions red and erase the grey and black. This was later strengthened by the 2017 Regulation on Religious Affairs. The policy that began in 2016 through the National Conference on Religious Relations mandated four restraints. Among other things, religion should implement core socialist values that preach socialism and the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Following the vague definition of “religious extremism”, the policy also threatens its propagators, supporters, and funders with severe punishment as being part of an “evil cult”. This rule very possibly points toward Islamism.
What is happening in Xinjiang right now is very messy. Not only is the PRC trying to securitize Islamic beliefs, but there is also an extreme movement circulating a 9/11 narrative that links the influence of Al-Qaeda to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is a political faction in Xinjiang.
To solve this, the PRC government takes preemptive measures on the offensive by attacking in anticipation of immediate aggression and danger. First, they legitimize PRC’s needs in counterterrorism or deradicalization programs. They then restructure the Xinjiang society in line with the Chinese Han majority through preventive oppression to maintain the status quo. This is done by erasing the cultural character of the local community by assimilation if not genocide. These two methods were also used interchangeably to allow for more elasticity in future policy adjustment.
The religious persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang presses on with the demolition of illegal religious architects including buildings, religious symbols, signs, Arabic script, or graveyards and shrines. There is also a strict prohibition on Islamic practices in everyday life such as the wearing of hijab for women and the growing of beards for men. The PRC government has also dissolved Islamic worship and arrested religious leaders. They then regulate mosque furnishings by placing portraits and slogans of Xi Jinping or Mao Zedong and raising the PRC national flag at the main gate to show patriotism.
According to Prof. Shih, the Chinese government continues to highlight that the globalization of Islamism or terrorism has jeopardized the practice of Islam in Xinjiang among Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities. Uyghur Muslims, based on his contact, can also be categorized into three: those who practice it culturally, those who practice Islam selectively for non-political purposes, and those who practice politics. The third type can be divided into many more groups from politicians to Islamist Jihadists, yet the majority of the Uyghur Muslims belong to the first category.
Prof. Chang, the second speaker, shares a similar view to Prof. Shih. In his presentation entitled “The Paradoxical Jihad of ‘Sinicization’: New Coming Campaign of Muslim Assimilation Under the Spreading Islamophobic Sentiment in Contemporary China”, he explained that Islam is not new in China and has been embraced by some Chinese people for a very long time.
However, there are two kinds of Muslims in China. The Hui Minzu is known as Sinophone Muslims or Sino Muslims, meaning that they are Chinese-speaking Muslims, and on the other hand, we have the Uyghurs who are known as Turkic-Speaking Muslims. The distribution of Sinophone Muslims is dominant as the symbiotic structure between the Muslim minority and the Han majority under the modern Chinese nation-state has been going on for more than 1000 years occurring in three dimensions: cultural change, social adaptation, and ethnic identity.
Therefore it comes as no surprise that many provinces in China such as Yunnan and Linxia have quite a lot of followers of Islam. In contrast to the situation in Xinjiang however, religious expression in the Sinophone Muslim region is relatively supported by the state. In Yunnan for example, there is a great combination of Confucianism and Islamic thought. Some old teachings like Qadim and Sufism Orders (Tarekat) also present Chineseness elements in the northwestern region of China. It is clearly visible, through the architecture of their mosque, that instead of having an Arabic style, some mosque architectures have a Chinese style. In tarekat orders, such as the Jahriyya in Linxia, respect and commemoration for their leaders of the order (murshid) are through the burning incense sticks.
The question begs to be asked: How is it that in recent years, themes like “Islamophobia in China” started to emerge?
The anti-Islam sentiment in China cannot be equated with Islamophobia in the West. In western countries, a fear of Islam exists because of their perception toward immigrants. Meanwhile, in China, Islam is not a new religion. It has existed for thousands of years. The new trend emerged after 2012 when the Chinese Communist Party waged a new war of Muslim assimilation under the spread of Islamophobic sentiments through an ambiguous excuse: total Sinicization of all religions. Following the government propaganda, in the new media, especially on the internet, extreme left intellectuals from the Han majority started openly spreading anti-Muslim hostility through hate speech.
The target of the CCP in this policy is very clear. They all point to the idea of jihad, scriptural Wahhabism on Sinophone Muslims and heterogeneous Turkic-speaking Muslims in Xinjiang. However, how can we distinguish these targets from those who are traditional and have been localized?
In 2015, the government also explicitly abolished three tendencies that they feared would make Islam in China extreme. The three tendencies are Arabicization, Saudicization which refers to Wahhabism, and Pan-Islamization which refers to political factions such as the Ikhwan. As a result, the government-mandated the change of Arabic symbols in the mosque. The dome, for example, is no longer visible in some mosques in China and has been replaced with the Confucian style of temples used by the Han majority.
Prof. Chang said the Xinjiang crisis and the proliferation of extreme anti-Muslim beliefs in China would pose three menaces, namely ethnic separatism, international terrorism, and religious extremism. However, he believes that the majority of Muslims in China are Muslims who believe in Islamic moderation. The centuries-old symbiosis between the Han majority and the Muslim minority can only be ensured and sustained through embracing moderate Islam as a part of Chinese civilization and allowing ethnic Muslims to preserve their socio-cultural identity in China.